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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
BANKRUPTCY

GENERAL 
DISCHARGE. The debtor had purchased several horses from 
an acquaintance who sold the right to payment to a creditor. 
The creditor had the debtor sign security agreements and 
financing statements and the loan agreement required the debtor 
to maintain an inventory of horses equal to at least $7,000. 
Although the debtor provided an inventory of horses, the debtor 
only owned one horse at the time of the execution of the loan 
agreement and security interest. The debtor claimed to have sold 
the remaining horses in order to obtain funds to continue the 
debtor’s horse training and shoeing business. The creditor sought 
to have the debtor denied a discharge in the Chapter 7 case under 
Section 727(a)(2) for selling the collateral horses with intent to 
defraud the creditor. The court held that a discharge was not 
denied under Section 727(a)(2) because the sale of the horses 
occurred more than one year before the bankruptcy filing and 
the creditor failed to demonstrate that the debtor had sold the 
horses with the intent to defraud the creditor. The court noted 
that the proceeds of the horse sales were used in the debtor’s 
business. The creditor also argued that the discharge should be 
denied under Section 727(a)(5) for the debtor’s failure to explain 
the loss of collateral. The court held that the discharge should 
not be denied under Section 727(a)(5) because the debtor 
satisfactorily explained the sale of the horses and the use of the 
proceeds in the business. The creditor argued that the loan was 
nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(2) because the debtor 
misrepresented the debtor’s inventory at the time of the loan. 
Although the court acknowledged that the debtor did falsely 
indicate that the debtor could comply with the inventory 
requirements of the loan agreement, the court held that the 
creditor failed to prove that the debtor deliberately made a false 
representation about the inventory with the intent to deceiving 
the creditor.  In re Glatt, 315 B.R. 511 (D. N.D. 2004). 
FEDERAL TAXATION 
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. The debtors originally 
filed for Chapter 11 and continued the operation of their nursing 
home business during the bankruptcy case. The business incurred 
FICA and FUTA taxes during the bankruptcy case and the IRS 
filed for payment of the taxes as an administrative claim. The 
debtors then filed a motion to convert the case to Chapter 13 
because the debtors no longer operated a business and sought a 
ruling that the taxes were no longer an administrative claim but 
were to be treated as a pre-petition tax claim, entitled to eighth 
priority. The court held that the taxes retained their administrative 
claim status after the conversion. In re Fowler, 2005-1 U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,152 (9th Cir. 2005). 
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL

PROGRAMS

HONEY. The CCC has adopted as final regulations 
amending the regulation governing the Honey Nonrecourse 
Marketing Assistance Loan (MAL) and Loan Deficiency 
Payment (LDP) Programs of the CCC. The final regulations 
allow honey pledged as collateral for securing an MAL or to 
be eligible for an LDP to be stored in CCC-approved, five-
gallon plastic storage containers, in addition to the plastic 
intermediate bulk containers already allowed, metal containers, 
and steel containers. 70 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Jan. 21, 2005).
   FEDERAL ESTATE

AND GIFT TAXATION

DISCLAIMER. The taxpayer and spouse had created a joint 
brokerage account. At the death of the spouse, the taxpayer 
was required to change the account to the taxpayer’s name in 
order to comply with account regulations. During the eight 
months after the spouse’s death, the taxpayer directed the sale 
and purchase of stock and made cash withdrawals. Within nine 
months after the death of the spouse, on the advice of an 
attorney, the taxpayer filed a written disclaimer of the spouse’s 
interest in the account less the amount of earnings accrued 
after the spouse’s death that the taxpayer had accepted benefits. 
The IRS ruled that the mere change of the name on the account 
was not deemed an acceptance of the benefits of the entire 
account; therefore, the disclaimer was effective for estate tax 
purposes. Ltr. Rul. 200503024, Oct. 5, 2004. 
MARITAL DEDUCTION. The decedent’s will provided 
for passing of estate property to the surviving spouse in trust 
for life. The trust made the surviving spouse the trustee and 
provided for the decedent’s children to be successor trustees. 
The trust also provided for distribution of “all of the net income 
from the trust estate as the trustee, in the trustee’s reasonable 
discretion, shall determine to be proper for the health, education, 
or support, maintenance, comfort and welfare of grantor’s 
surviving spouse in accordance with the surviving spouse’s 
accustomed manner of living.” The court held that this language 
did not meet the all income requirement for qualification of 
the trust for the marital deduction because, under the language, 
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less than all the income could be distributed. In addition, the 
surviving spouse’s position as trustee did no insure distribution 
of all trust income to the surviving spouse because someone 
other than the surviving spouse could be a trustee. See Harl, 
“Handling Taxation of Settlements and Court Judgments,” supra 
p. 9. Estate of Davis v. Comm’r, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 60,497 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2003-55. 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
CORPORATIONS 
CONSTRUCTIVE OWNERSHIP. A family corporation was 
owned primarily by two brothers, with one initially owning 
68 percent of the stock and the other owning 26 percent of the 
stock. The remaining stock was owned by spouses and children 
of the brothers. In 1996, the corporation executed an I.R.C. § 
368(a)(1)(D), “type D,” reorganization and the first brother’s 
share dropped from 68 to 19 percent and the second brother’s 
share increased to 65 percent. In 1998, the first brother 
purchased the shares of the second brother so that the first 
brother owned 85 percent of the corporation. On its 1998 
income tax return, the corporation claimed a net operating loss 
deduction for both regular and alternative minimum tax 
purposes. The IRS adjusted the NOL under I.R.C. § 382(a) 
which limits the amount of “pre-change” losses which may be 
claimed after a corporation has a change in ownership that 
effects a change of more than 50 percentage points in the 
ownership of a shareholder. The Section 382(a) limitation was 
applied because the first brother’s share of the corporation’s 
stock changed from 19 percent to 85 after the purchase of the 
second brother’s stock. The corporation argued that the two 
brothers were treated as one shareholder under the constructive 
ownership rules of I.R.C. § 318 because the brothers shared 
the same parents and grandparents. The IRS argued that the 
link by the parents and grandparents did not apply because the 
parents and grandparents were all deceased. Initially, the court 
held that the statute allowed for the interpretations argued by 
both parties. After examining the legislative history and IRS 
regulations, the court held that the constructive ownership rule 
looked primarily at the shareholders and their link of ownership 
through a living shareholder. The court held that, because there 
was no living parent or grandparent shareholder, the two 
brothers were not related sufficiently to include the ownership 
share of one brother as the ownership share of the other brother. 
Therefore, because the one brother’s individual ownership 
share changed from 19 to 84 percent, the net operating loss 
deduction limitation of I.R.C. § 382(a) applied to the 
corporation. Garber Industries holding Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 
124 T.C. 1 (2005). 
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. This case 
consolidated appeals from a Ninth Circuit and Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals case. In the Ninth Circuit case, the taxpayer 
had been employed as a loan officer in a bank but was forced 
to leave when the taxpayer refused to divulge confidential 
information about clients. The taxpayer sued the bank for 
intentional interference with contract and economic 
expectations for wrongful discharge from employment. The 
parties eventually reached a settlement which included 
punitive damages and payment directly to the taxpayer’s 
attorneys. The taxpayer argued that the compensatory 
damages, the portion of the settlement paid to the attorneys 
and the punitive damages were excludible from income. The 
Tax Court acknowledged that the taxpayer’s lawsuit was 
based on tort but held that the settlement proceeds and 
punitive damages were included in income because the tort 
was not based on personal injuries. Although acknowledging 
a split of authority on the issue, the Tax Court also held that 
the settlement proceeds paid directly to the taxpayer’s 
attorney were included in income. The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed on the issue of the settlement proceeds paid to the 
taxpayer but reversed on the issue of the taxability of the 
attorneys’ fee portion of the settlement, holding that, under 
Oregon law, the attorney’s had sufficient property rights in 
the fees to remove them from the taxpayer’s taxable income. 
Banaitis v. Comm’r, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), aff ’g in 
part and rev’g in part, T.C. Memo. 2002-5. In the Sixth 
Circuit case, the taxpayer sued a former employer for race 
discrimination in termination of employment. The suit asked 
only for back pay and attorneys’ fees as damages. The parties 
reached a settlement which characterized the payments as 
for personal injury to the taxpayer. The Tax Court held that 
the character of the settlement proceeds was determined by 
the pending claims made in the lawsuit; therefore, the 
settlement proceeds were for back pay and attorneys’ fees 
and were included in the taxpayer’s income. The Sixth 
Circuit affirmed on the issue of whether the settlement 
proceeds were included in the taxpayer’s income but 
reversed on the issue of the attorneys’ fees, which were 
excluded from income because the contingency fee 
agreement removed the fees from the taxpayer’s control. 
Banks v. Comm’r, 345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003), aff ’g in 
part and rev’g in part, T.C. Memo. 2001-48. The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that attorney contingent fees were 
included in both taxpayer’s income under the assignment 
of income doctrine. Note that, under the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, for fees and 
costs paid after October 22, 2004, with respect to a judgment 
or settlement occurring after that date, a deduction is allowed 
for attorneys fees and other costs associated with actions 
involving discrimination in employment or enforcement of 
civil rights. AJCA 2004, Sec. 703, amending I.R.C. § 
62(a)(19). Banaitis v. Comm’r, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH ) ¶ 50,155 (Sup. Ct. 2005), rev’g, 340 F.3d 1074 
(9th Cir. 2003), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, T.C. Memo. 
2002-5; Banks. v. Comm’r, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH ) 
¶ 50,155 (Sup. Ct. 2005), rev’g, 345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 
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2003), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, T.C. Memo. 2001­
48. 
The taxpayers had originally included in taxable income 
an award from an employment discrimination lawsuit. The 
taxpayer later filed amended returns excluding the award 
from taxable income and claiming a refund. In a Chief 
Counsel Advice letter, the IRS ruled that the amended return 
was not “frivolous,” although it was incorrect, and was not 
subject to a frivolous return penalty under I.R.C. § 6702(a). 
CCA Ltr. Rul. 200502042, July 27, 2004. 
DEPRECIATION. An airplane was sold by the 
manufacturer to a third party which did not take possession 
of the plane before it was reacquired by the manufacturer. 
The taxpayer purchased the airplane through a disregarded, 
for tax purposes, partnership owned by the taxpayer. During 
the time between the date the plane was reacquired by the 
manufacturer and the date the plane was purchased by the 
taxpayer, the plane was used for demonstrations, loaned out 
for customers’ use while awaiting delivery of other planes 
and flown for testing purposes. Thus, the plane had many 
hours of use before the purchase by the taxpayer; however, 
the hours were less than 2 percent of the expected life of the 
plane. The IRS ruled that the pre-purchase use of the plane 
did not disqualify the plane for first time use for purposes of 
the first year additional depreciation under I.R.C. § 168(k)(4). 
Ltr. Rul. 200502004, Sept. 30, 2004. 
DISASTER LOSSES. On January 11, 2005, the President 
determined that certain areas in Indiana were eligible for 
assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (42 USC 5121) as a result of a snow, which 
began on December 21, 2004. FEMA-3197-EM. On January 
11, 2005, the President determined that certain areas in Ohio 
were eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of record 
snow, which began on December 22, 2004. FEMA-3198­
EM. Accordingly, taxpayers in the affected areas who 
sustained losses may deduct them on their 2003 federal 
income tax returns. 
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DEDUCTION. The 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-357), 
added I.R.C. § 199 which provides taxpayer-employers with 
a deduction equal to the lesser of a phased-in percentage of 
taxable income or qualified production activities income. In 
the case of an individual, the deduction is equal to the 
applicable percentage of adjusted gross income. The IRS 
has issued guidelines for calculating the deduction. The 
Digest will publish an article on the new guidelines by Dr. 
Neil Harl in a future issue. Notice 2005-14, I.R.B. 2005-5. 
EARNED INCOME CREDIT. The IRS has added to its 
web site an “EITC Assistant” which can assist taxpayers in 
determining eligibility for and the amount of earned income 
tax credit. The new assistant can be found at 
w w w . i r s . u s t r e a s . g o v / i n d i v i d u a l s / a r t i c l e /  
0,,id=130102,00.html IR-2005-11. 
IRA. The taxpayer owned an IRA and was receiving annual 
distributions under I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(iv). In one tax year, 
the taxpayer had received only a portion of the scheduled 
distribution and the taxpayer submitted a request for the 
remainder of the required distribution. The IRA custodian 
failed to make the requested distribution until the following 
tax year.  The IRS ruled that the late distribution would not 
be considered a modification of the payment schedule or an 
excessive distribution in the second tax year.  Ltr. Rul. 
200503036, Oct. 25, 2004. 
The taxpayer had rolled over a distribution from a pension 
fund to an IRA without income tax recognition.  The taxpayer 
later withdrew the entire IRA fund, including earnings, and 
claimed the distribution as taxable income. The taxpayer filed 
a claim for refund, arguing that the original rollover amount 
was not taxable upon distribution from the IRA because it 
established a cost basis in the IRA fund equal to the amount 
of the rollover.  The court held that the rollover of the funds 
from the pension account to the IRA did not change the tax 
nature of the funds which continued to be subject to the rules 
of distributions from pension funds or IRAs. Sternberg v. 
Comm’r, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,147 (2d Cir. 
2005), aff’g unpub. op., 2004-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
50,202 (E.D. N.Y. 2002). 
MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS. The IRS has 
announced that the Archer Medical Savings Accounts pilot 
project was not ended, under I.R.C. § 220(j)(2), in 2004 
because less than 750,000 individuals have established the 
accounts so far. The Archer pilot MSA program is scheduled 
to end in 2005. Ann. 2005-12, I.R.B. 2005-5. 
PARTNERSHIPS 
MERGERS. The IRS had issued Rev. Rul. 2004-43, I.R.B. 
2004-18, 842 which provided rules for recognition of gain 
or loss created in an assets-over merger. In response to 
comments that the ruling was contrary to existing regulations, 
the IRS has announced that Rev. Rul. 2004-43 is revoked 
and new regulations will be issued which provide the rules 
included in the ruling. Notice 2005-15, I.R.B. 2005-5; Rev. 
Rul. 2005-10, I.R.B. 2005-5. 
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has added a new code (Code 
Z —Income under I.R.C. § 409A on a nonqualified deferred 
compensation plan), for use in box 12 on the 2005 Form W-
2, and Instructions for Forms W-2 and W-3. Employers must 
use code Z in box 12 of Form W-2 to report the income shown 
in box 1 that relates to the recognition of income due to 
participation in a nonqualified deferred compensation plan 
that fails to meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 409A. Income 
recognized under I.R.C. § 409A for nonemployees should 
be reported both in box 7 and box 15b of Form 1099-MISC. 
Ann. 2005-5, I.R.B. 2005-4. 
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SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES

February 2005

Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly 
Short-term 
AFR 2.92 2.90 2.89 2.88 
110 percent AFR 3.22 3.29 3.18 3.17 
120 percent AFR 3.51 3.48 3.46 3.46 
Mid-term 
AFR 3.83 3.79 3.77 3.76 
110 percent AFR 4.21 4.17 4.15 4.13 
120 percent AFR 4.60 4.55 4.52 4.51 
Long-term 
AFR 4.72 4.67 4.64 4.63 
110 percent AFR 5.21 5.14 5.11 5.09 
120 percent AFR 5.68 5.60 5.56 5.54 
Rev. Rul. 2005-8, I.R.B. 2005-6. 
NEGLIGENCE 
RECREATIONAL USE. The plaintiff was a two year old 
child who accompanied parents to a county fair organized and 
operated by the defendant. While at the fair, the plaintiff spent 
much of the time in a backpack carried by the parent. However, 
when the parent visited the lawn tractor displays, the plaintiff 
was allowed to climb on to the tractors. The parent was an 
employee of a manufacturer of lawn tractors and was visiting 
the fair, in part, to see what products were being offered by 
competitors. After visiting the tractors, the plaintiff had an ice 
cream cone, although the parent wiped the child’s hands before 
the child ate the ice cream cone. The plaintiff suffered E. coli 
poisoning and was hospitalized. The plaintiff, through, the 
parent, sued the defendant for failure to control the animal waste 
at the fair, which the plaintiff claimed was carried to the lawn 
tractors by employees and other fair attendees from the animal 
barns. The defendant pled immunity from the suit under the 
Wisconsin Recreational Use statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.52. The 
plaintiff argued that the recreational use statute did not apply 
because the injury was caused from the condition of the lawn 
equipment and not a condition of the land. The plaintiff argued 
that the term “property” in the statute referred only to the real 
property and not to movable property such as the lawn tractors. 
The court held that the recreational use statute did apply to the 
cause of action because the focus of the negligence claim was 
on the defendant’s improper control of animal waste on the 
property and not the negligent handling of the lawn tractors. 
The plaintiff also argued that the recreational use statute did 
not apply because the parent’s main purpose in visiting the fair 
was not recreational but was related to the parent’s business. 
The court reviewed past cases where plaintiffs had recreational 
and nonrecreational purposes for being on the property and 
noted that where a recreational use was made of the property, 
even though the main purpose was nonrecreational, the 
recreation use statute applied to injuries sustained during the 
recreational use. The court held that, because the plaintiff child 
made use of the recreational aspects of the county fair, the 
injuries suffered were excepted from liability of the defendant 
by the recreational use statute. The court went so far as to state 
“As long as one of the purposes for engaging in the activity is 
recreation, as it concededly was here, the statute attaches and 
bars their claim.” Kautz v. Ozaukee County Agricultural 
Society, 688 N.W.2d 771 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). 
ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE. The plaintiff chicken egg 
farmer hired the defendant to upgrade the ventilation system in 
one of the chicken barns so that all existing fans were tied to a 
central control system which would automatically control the 
air quality in the barn. The defendant installed a central control 
unit purchased by the plaintiff from a third party.  The central 
control unit failed, resulting in the loss of 18,000 chickens. The 
plaintiff sued the defendant for negligent performance of the 
wiring services because the evidence showed that the central 
control unit was not properly installed in that the backup control 
was not connected to the power circuits. The jury returned a 
verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. The 
defendant argued that the action was barred by the economic 
loss doctrine in that the defendant had provided only a product, 
the ventilation system, and not a service. The court held that the 
contract was primarily for the services of the defendant in that 
the main item installed, the central control unit, was supplied 
by the plaintiff from a third party manufacturer. Although the 
defendant claimed to have provided additional parts for the 
system, the defendant did not provide any evidence to identify 
the additional parts. The court discussed the split authority 
outside of Wisconsin on the issue of whether the economic loss 
doctrine, limiting damages to the value of the contracted for 
services or product, should apply to contracts for services 
provided to commercial parties. The court declined to extend 
the doctrine to contracts for services because such contracts do 
not have the same remedies under the Uniform Commercial 
Code as do product contracts. Therefore, the court held that the 
plaintiff’s action in negligence was not barred by the economic 
loss doctrine. Insurance Co. of North America v. Cease 
Electric, Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462 (Wis. 2004), aff’g, 674 N.W.2d 
886 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). 
NUISANCE 
COMPOST. The main lawsuit involved nuisance and 
negligence actions filed by neighboring land owners against a 
county landfill operation for hazardous substances and odors 
released from the landfill. The defendant mushroom grower was 
added as a third-party defendant because the waste material from 
the mushroom operations contributed to the odors released from 
the landfill operation. The defendant had operated the mushroom 
farm in the area since 1967 when the area was entirely rural. At 
the time of the lawsuit, a significant residential population 
surrounded the farm and landfill. Although the mushrooms were 
always grown indoors, the compost used to grow the mushrooms 
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was initially produced outside but was moved to an indoor 
facility in order to control odors from the compost activity. 
The defendant argued that a nuisance action could not be 
brought against the defendant because the action was barred 
by the Washington right-to-farm statute, Rev. Code Wash. §§ 
7.48.300 - .310, .905. Under the right-to-farm statute, a farm 
is exempt from nuisance actions unless  (1) the agricultural 
activity has a substantial adverse effect on public health and 
safety; (2) the activity is inconsistent with good agricultural 
practices, laws, and rules; or (3) the activity was not 
established prior to surrounding nonagricultural activities. The 
plaintiffs argued that the indoor compost facility was not an 
agricultural activity covered by the statute and the change to 
the indoor facility was a “new or radically expanded activity” 
excepted from the act by the third exception. The court found 
that the plaintiff’s first argument focused solely on the 
production of the compost and was based on the holding in 
Donovan v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 678 F.2d 1166 (3d Cir. 1982), 
which held that a mushroom composting business was not an 
agricultural operation for purposes of the Federal Labor 
Standards Act because most of the compost was sold to 
customers. The court distinguished the present case from 
Donovan in that the defendant used all the compost in the 
defendant’s growing of mushrooms, an agricultural 
commodity. Therefore, the court held that the composting was 
an agricultural activity as part of the larger mushroom growing 
operation. Although the plaintiff’s second argument was 
summarily denied because the issue was not raised at trial, 
the court held that the change to an indoor composting facility 
was not a new or radically expanded activity because the same 
composting had occurred since the start of the mushroom farm. 
Because none of the exceptions was demonstrated by the 
plaintiff as applying to the defendant, the court held that the 
defendant was protected from liability by the right-to-farm 
act. Vicwood Meridian Partnership v. Skagit Sand and 
Gravel, 98 P.3d 1277 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
PRODUCT LIABILITY 
ANTIQUE TRACTOR. The plaintiff’s decedent had 
purchased an antique tractor from the defendants. Although 
the decedent had brought a trailer to carry the tractor back to 
the decedent’s farm, the tractor was too wide for the trailer 
and the decedent had to drive the tractor back. The decedent 
had tested the brakes on the tractor before starting the trip 
and the tractor was able to handle many hills before the 
accident. However, at one hill, the tractor lost power and rolled 
backwards. The decedent was unable to stop the tractor using 
the brakes and was killed when the tractor rolled over. The 
plaintiff sued in negligence, claiming that the defendant sold 
the tractor without sufficient brakes. Trial evidence provided 
some indication that the decedent had driven the tractor with 
the brakes engaged, causing the brakes to wear out. The trial 
jury found that the decedent had been more than 51 percent 
negligent in the accident. In response to a jury question, the 
trial judge answered that the jury did not have to apportion 
fault between the plaintiff and defendant. The plaintiff 
appealed, arguing that the decedent was not negligent as a 
matter of law and that it was reversible error for the trial judge 
not to require the jury to apportion negligence between the 
parties. The appellate court held that, once the jury determined 
that the plaintiff was more than 51 percent at fault, an 
apportionment of fault was not necessary because the jury 
determination settled the issue of negligence in favor of the 
defendant, barring recovery by the plaintiff. The appellate court 
also upheld the jury verdict as supported by sufficient evidence 
that the decedent had improperly driven the tractor with the 
brakes engaged, causing the brakes to fail and the accident to 
occur. Payne v. Knutson, 99 P.3d 200 (Mont. 2004). 
CITATION UPDATES 
Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms, Inc., 387 F.3d 1167 (10th 
Cir. 2004) (hog confinement system) see 15 Agric. L. Dig. 171 
(2004). 
IN THE NEWS 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. The Environmental Protection 
Agency has announced a landmark air quality compliance 
agreement they say aims to address emissions from certain 
animal feeding operations. As part of the plan, the EPA will 
ensure such operations comply with the Clean Air Act, and 
will gather the scientific data needed to make informed air 
policy going forward. Participants will pay a civil penalty for 
presumed violations of the Clean Air Act of between $200 
and $100,000 based on the size and number of farms in their 
operation. They will also contribute $2,500 to a fund that will 
cover the cost of the emissions monitoring program. See http:/ 
/www.agriculture.com/ag/story. jhtml?storyid=/  
t e m p l a t e d a t a / a g / s t o r y / d a t a /  
agNews_050124crEPA.xml&catref=ag1001 
NATIONAL ANIMAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM. The 
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Agency (APHIS) has created a website that will 
provide information for livestock producers about the new 
program. In addition to details on the USDA program, the 
website also lists contacts and information on state-specific 
authorities. In the future, APHIS says they will expand the 
site to also include specie-specific information for producers. 
Identification systems for cattle, sheep, poultry, deer and other 
livestock are still in the works. See http:// 
animalid.aphis.usda.gov/nais/index.shtml 
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CURRENT PRINT VERSION DIGEST SUBSCRIBERS

Change your print subscription to the e-mail version and receive the first full 
year (starting with your next renewal date) for $80.00. The regular subscription rate 
($90.00/yr) will apply starting the second year. 
That is a $10.00 savings over the regular e-mail subscription cost and $30.00 
savings over the current print annual subscription cost. 
If you have issues left on your current subscription, your subscription will be 
extended by one issue for each three issues you have remaining. 
What is an e-mail subscription? 
On the Monday prior to each regular publishing date of the Digest, the Digest 
is converted to a PDF (portable document file) format and attached to e-mails. This 
means e-mail subscribers receive each Digest issue at least six days before the printed 
version would normally arrive via the US Postal Service. 
The PDF file is a facsimile of the printed Digest and is accessible on all types 
of computers and operating systems. The PDF file can be accessed with any PDF 
reader software, including Adobe Acrobat, Adobe Acrobat Reader, and Adobe 
Acrobat Approval. With most PDF readers, the file can be searched, copied and 
printed. The file can be quickly forwarded through your internal e-mail network to 
each member of your firm. 
To receive your free sample e-mail issue, just send an e-mail to 
robert@agrilawpress.com requesting a copy. If you find the issue more convenient, 
more timely, and less costly than your print issue, just let us know and we will 
change your subscription immediately. 
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